Agnology - a study in human ignorance

He has been manifested in a human body for this reason only, out of the love and goodness of His Father, for the salvation of us men.… The first fact that you must grasp is this: the renewal of creation has been wrought by the Self-same Word Who made it in the beginning. --Athanasius, De Incarnatione

Protestantism has come to inherit a certain reputation. The story which is told, and which many children of the Reformation have come to enjoy, begins with the idea that it was modern, Protestant world which disenchanted the world, in Max Weber’s memorable phrase. It could perhaps be argued that the evidence against the Reformation is largely circumstantial—a matter of being in the wrong place at precisely the wrong time—except for the fact that so many modern Protestants want to take credit for the crime (particularly in the more historically-oriented traditions, Lutheranism and Calvinism). We are very happy to play the role of homewrecker in the early modern divorce between nature and grace.

The political terms of this divorce are central to the story: the Reformation cemented a new dualism of civil and spiritual authority, in which the civil—or temporal—realm was disenchanted of the meddling influences of the spiritual (which was identified with the sacerdotalism of the papalists). The medieval idea of two swords within one Christendom was replaced by the modern idea of Luther’s “two kingdoms,” in which the temporal had jurisdiction over this world, and the spiritual over the next. D.G. Hart argues along these lines that Protestantism was the capstone of Western political secularism:

By reducing the authority of the church in the secular or nonreligious sphere, Protestantism solidified the separation of church and state that had long characterized the West and came to dominate the modern era. Gone was the notion that revelation or churchly authorities govern the civil jurisdiction. Instead, with Protestantism… came the possibility for the study of and theorizing about politics to emerge as a separate sphere.

But the question could arise as to why this particular telling of the story neglects a certain strand of early Reformation thought, one which did not seek to divorce nature from grace, and yet stands out as strikingly Protestant. For in between the world of monadic nature and the world of monadic grace there lies a hypostasis —it is here that an alternate narrative of Protestant political authority resides. The parallelism between the metaphysical realms of nature and grace, and the political realms of the civil and the ecclesiastical, suggest that our view of the nature of political authority cannot be divorced from our views of the historical significance of the act of Incarnation. For it is at this hypostatic juncture that the realms of nature and of grace most pointedly intersect, and must therefore inform our view of political authority.

The rumor of God seems an unwieldy thing. It’s like some childhood game of telephone which delivers truth over to falsehood and ends in a complete unraveling of language by the end of the line. Such is the way that men speak of God, say the postmoderns. One age delivers their myth to another age, which in turn shapes and distorts according to its whim. In the end, you have a god for urbanites and a god for trailer parks, a god for the rich and a god for the underprivileged, a god for any economic or political culture in which you find yourself. When God is only a rumor, when He has been presumed dead, you find not one, but many, to take His place. In short, postmodernism is polytheistic.

This is the problem in an age of self-proclaimed doubt, where the wisdom of modernity’s elders is distrusted. Truth, according to popular belief, has been cast out on the wind, and who can shepherd it home? This seems to be what Eliot had in mind when he wrote:

Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle
With words and meanings. The poetry does not matter.
It was not (to start again) what one had expected.
What was to be the value of the long looked forward to,
Long hoped for calm, the autumnal serenity
And the wisdom of age? Had they deceived us
Or deceived themselves, the quiet-voiced elders,
Bequeathing us merely a receipt for deceit?

The deceit of the elders: a promise that our wrestling with words and meaning would not end in futility—that it would matter. They were wrong and they were liars, says Eliot. Their search for knowledge was “useless in the darkness into which they peered.” The moderns sought “knowledge derived from experience,” but time gave the lie to that sort of knowledge. We have learned that time imposes new patterns and experiences which dizzy us, disorient us. “Every moment is a new and shocking / Valuation.”

So it is with language. Logos birthed in chaos will engender uncertainty in culture (in a weird hybrid of Derrida and Orwell). Do we raise a cry of alarm, like Orwell? Or, with Derrida, do we slyly poke fun at the doddering old moderns as they try to summon Truth with the word “truth.”

In Solomon Among the Postmoderns, Dr. Leithart wrote:

We can no more bring the world under our complete control than we can guide the wind into a paddock for the night. We can no more give permanent form to the world than we can sculpt the evening breeze into solid shapes. Our projects are not sandcastles on the beach. That image, for Solomon, would suggest something far too solid and permanent. Our projects are cloud castles on a windy day.

Solomon asks, “Who knows the interpretation of a word?” and the modern believes the question not to be rhetorical. A word can be known. A word can be analyzed, parsed, spread out like a patient etherized on the grammarian’s table. The word, the basic building block in language, can be used to build to truth if—in its foundation—it is “perfectly known and incapable of being doubted,” as Descartes put it. Peace and unity can only be won if humankind can begin from these objective foundations of truthful language and build up an entire structure of Truth. Modernity lacked the advantage of those at Shinar; moderns live post-Babel, with many tongues. So modernity had to construct a new story of the language of Reason, the tongue which all men possess. This is something common to modern philosophers from Descartes to Locke to Kant.

This is what Derrida is attacking (although, as we’ll see in a minute, his line of attack is a complicated one). Plato’s Pharmacy is a long, winding, playful piece—one which took me to the very end before I decided it was worthwhile. But it in spite of its wanderings, in the end it provides a very sharp critique, first, of the way we view words, and second, the way we view truth.

He has been manifested in a human body for this reason only, out of the love and goodness of His Father, for the salvation of us men.… The first fact that you must grasp is this: the renewal of creation has been wrought by the Self-same Word Who made it in the beginning. --Athanasius, De Incarnatione

Protestantism has come to inherit a certain reputation. The story which is told, and which many children of the Reformation have come to enjoy, begins with the idea that it was modern, Protestant world which disenchanted the world, in Max Weber’s memorable phrase. It could perhaps be argued that the evidence against the Reformation is largely circumstantial—a matter of being in the wrong place at precisely the wrong time—except for the fact that so many modern Protestants want to take credit for the crime (particularly in the more historically-oriented traditions, Lutheranism and Calvinism). We are very happy to play the role of homewrecker in the early modern divorce between nature and grace.

The political terms of this divorce are central to the story: the Reformation cemented a new dualism of civil and spiritual authority, in which the civil—or temporal—realm was disenchanted of the meddling influences of the spiritual (which was identified with the sacerdotalism of the papalists). The medieval idea of two swords within one Christendom was replaced by the modern idea of Luther’s “two kingdoms,” in which the temporal had jurisdiction over this world, and the spiritual over the next. D.G. Hart argues along these lines that Protestantism was the capstone of Western political secularism:

By reducing the authority of the church in the secular or nonreligious sphere, Protestantism solidified the separation of church and state that had long characterized the West and came to dominate the modern era. Gone was the notion that revelation or churchly authorities govern the civil jurisdiction. Instead, with Protestantism… came the possibility for the study of and theorizing about politics to emerge as a separate sphere.

Oliver O’Donovan suggests that this sort of story-telling can be dismissed, in part, as self-congratulatory (and perhaps misguidedly so). A further question might arise as to why this particular telling of the story neglects a certain strand of early Reformation thought, one which did not seek to divorce nature from grace, and yet stands out as strikingly Protestant. For in between the theoretical worlds of monadic nature and monadic grace there lies a hypostasis —it is here that an alternate narrative of Protestant political authority resides. The parallelism between the metaphysical realms of nature and grace, and the political realms of the civil and the ecclesiastical, suggest that our view of the nature of political authority cannot be divorced from our view of the paradigmatic significance of the act of Incarnation. For it is at this hypostatic juncture that the realms of nature and of grace most pointedly intersect, and must therefore inform our view of political authority.